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PLACE-BASED POLICIES AND THE HOUSING MARKET
Hans R. A. Koster and Jos van Ommeren*
Abstract—We study the economic effects of place-based policies in the
housing market, by investigating the effects of a place-based program on
prices of surrounding owner-occupied properties. The program improved
the quality of public housing in 83 impoverished neighborhoods through-
out the Netherlands. We combine a first-difference approach with a fuzzy
regression-discontinuity design to address the fundamental issue that these
neighborhoods are endogenously treated. Improvements in public housing
induced surrounding housing prices to increase by 3.5%. The program’s
external benefits are sizable and at least half of the value of investments in
public housing.
I. Introduction
IN many countries, place-based policies have been devel-oped that make large public investments in poor neigh-
borhoods. Economists are not necessarily in favor of these
policies. It has been argued that governments should help
people rather than places, and “not bribe people to live in
unattractive places” (Glaeser, 2011). However, if nonmar-
ket interactions are important, this may justify place-based
policies. In Europe, place-based policies often improve the
quality of the public housing stock through new home con-
struction to replace an obsolete building stock or through sub-
stantial renovations to the existing stock.1 This benefits not
only public housing tenants but also nearby residents through
higher neighborhood quality.
Ample attention has been paid to the effectiveness of place-
based labor market programs (Neumark & Kolko, 2010;
Mayer, Mayneris, & Py, 2012; Busso, Gregory, & Kline,
2013; Kline & Moretti, 2013; and Neumark & Simpson,
2015, for an overview). However, the effects of place-based
housing policies on local residents have not been researched
much. Few studies confirm that place-based investments have
led to higher house prices (Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001;
Schwartz et al., 2006; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, & Owens,
2010). This does not imply, however, that place-based poli-
cies are always effective. For example, a number of stud-
ies, including De Souza Briggs (1999), Lee, Culhane, and
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1In Europe, public housing is common and covers 47% of the rental market
(Van Ommeren & Van der Vlist, 2016).
Wachter (1999), and Ahlfeldt, Maennig, and Richter (2016),
find no statistically significant, or even small negative effects
of place-based policies that subsidize housing.
While programs to upgrade public housing are common in
many cities (e.g., in Australia, France, Spain, United King-
dom, and the United States), settings where it is feasible
to credibly identify spillover effects from these large-scale
housing investments are uncommon. Typically, these studies
focus on a specific program with a small number of neighbor-
hoods in a specific city. Furthermore, because neighborhood
selection is endogenous—only the worst-performing sites re-
ceive subsidies—the estimates of the benefits of the program
may not be causal.
We evaluate the effects of an unusually large, nation-
wide urban revitalization program in the Netherlands, start-
ing in 2007, which sought to improve the quality of pub-
lic housing. We aim to measure external effects by focusing
on changes in prices of owner-occupied housing units,
which were not improved by the program. In this so-called
krachtwijken-program (henceforth, KW-investment scheme),
83 neighborhoods were selected for revitalization with fund-
ing from the national government.2 The government and
(nonprofit) public housing associations announced investing
about €2.75 billion in these neighborhoods, on average about
€7,000 per household in receiving neighborhoods, but even-
tually only €1 billion was spent (Permentier, Kullberg, &
Van Noije, 2013). The main objectives of the program were
to transform these neighborhoods into pleasant places to live
and to reduce social inequality (Department of Housing, Spa-
tial Planning and the Environment, 2007). In the end almost
all of the money (90%) was spent on improving the qual-
ity of the public housing stock. The remainder was spent on
green spaces and social empowerment programs (Wittebrood
& Permentier, 2011). We use a nationwide data set with in-
formation on thousands of privately owned repeat-sales ob-
servations from 2000 to 2014.3
The main contribution of this paper is the identifica-
tion of causal effects of place-based policies on property
values. We take into account that neighborhoods targeted
by place-based policies are not randomly chosen but are
explicitly chosen because of undesirable characteristics.
We combine a first-differences estimation strategy with a
regression-discontinuity design by using information on an
eligibility criterion to receive investments. Hence, we com-
pare the change in housing prices close to the z-score
threshold. This criterion is dependent on deprivation scores,
2The scheme was also known as aandachtswijken-scheme or
Vogelaarwijken-scheme.
3About 90% of the Dutch rental housing stock is rent controlled, and about
60% of stock is owner occupied. We do not expect to detect any effect on the
controlled public housing rent, but there may be effects on rents of private
rental housing. Because of lower data quality for private and public housing
rents, we examine this in the sensitivity analysis (see appendix C.4).
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calculated by the national government. However, there are
fourteen noncomplying neighborhoods with scores that were
too low but were selected or had sufficiently high scores but
did not receive treatment in the end. We therefore use a fuzzy
regression-discontinuity design (FRD), for which it was nec-
essary to observe a substantial jump in the probability of
being treated. Indeed, at the neighborhood level, we observe
a more than 90% increase in the probability of being treated
when the deprivation score exceeds a certain threshold. More-
over, we show that there is no bunching at the threshold
confirming that z-scores could not be influenced by local
governments.
We generalize the results into two directions. First, we
make a distinction between the short-run and long-run effects
of place-based policies. This distinction is relevant, because
we are mainly interested in the extent to which beneficial
place-based policies increase house prices in the long run.
These policies are thought to reduce sales times temporarily
(i.e., in the short run) but do not affect sales time in the long
run, while prices should adjust almost immediately when new
information becomes available.4 Estimates of the temporal
policy effects on sales time and prices are then indicative
how much time it takes before the market returns to a long-
run steady state and can be used as an internal consistency
test: if one does not find a temporary effect of place-based
policies on sales times while finding a permanent effect on
prices, then this will put doubt on the causality of an effect
on prices.5
Second, we pay attention to treatment heterogeneity by
investigating whether treatment is more effective in more
deprived neighborhoods and by including interactions of
neighborhood demographics, such as population density and
neighborhood income, with the treatment effect.6
We find that due to place-based investments that improve
the quality of public housing, house prices increased by at
least 3.5%. Sales times are reduced temporarily and bounce
back to their initial levels in about 7.5 years. We also find
that the effect is much stronger in dense areas. For exam-
ple, when population density doubles, the treatment effect
is 4.3 percentage points higher. This is likely explained by
spillovers that are more pronounced when properties are
closer to each other. We further find that neighborhoods that
4See appendix A for a formal derivation of these results based on a stylized
model extending the search and matching framework by Wheaton (1990).
This model combines a standard spatial equilibrium framework with buyer
search costs that are proportional to house prices in the long run.
5One conceptual difficulty is that our observations of sales times imply
the presence of housing vacancies, so changes in house prices do not neces-
sarily reflect changes in welfare. We demonstrate in appendix A that given
the assumption of a spatial equilibrium, one may ignore this issue because
changes in long-run prices induced by place-based policies are slight under-
estimates of welfare changes when the housing vacancy rate is low, which
is usually the case.
6A recent study by Diamond and McQuade (2016) analyzes the effects
of increases in the quantity of subsidized houses and finds heterogeneous
effects due to the increase of low-income households in the area: housing
subsidies cause house prices to decrease in higher-income areas while gen-
erating house price increases in lower-income areas, which is mainly due
to sorting effects.
have received more funding per square meter also have expe-
rienced stronger price increases. For example, the treatment
effect for the average spending is 2.1%, while this can eas-
ily triple for neighborhoods for which the treatment intensity
is higher. Eventually, we calculate that the welfare benefits
to property owners induced by the program are at least half
of the value of the investments in public housing. Moreover,
we show that renters in public housing have not faced a rent
increase yet have seen an increase in neighborhood quality.
Hence, they are definitely better off, in particular because
they may also have benefited from direct improvements in
their properties. In other words, the program seems to have
been effective in increasing the utility of poorer households.
An extensive sensitivity analysis confirms these results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, we discuss the features of the KW-investment scheme
and the selection of the neighborhoods. Section III elaborates
on the econometric framework, the data, and some graphical
descriptive evidence. Section IV turns to the empirical results,
followed by a summary of sensitivity analyses in section V.
Section VI is a calculation of the overall gains of the program
and section VII concludes.
II. Local Context
A. The Urban Revitalization Program
There is ample empirical evidence that households with
low incomes and associated social problems are dispropor-
tionally concentrated in certain urban neighborhoods. For ex-
ample, many U.S. inner cities contain large concentrations of
low-income households and score high on most measures of
social dysfunction (Mills & Lubuele, 1997; Glaeser, Kahn,
& Rappaport, 2008; Rosenthal & Ross, 2015). In the Nether-
lands, we observe a similar but less extreme pattern due to
the existence of substantial benefit transfers and the universal
provision of public housing. About 70% of the most deprived
neighborhoods are located in the four largest cities (Amster-
dam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht). The share of public
housing is much higher in these neighborhoods than in other
parts of the Netherlands. The gap between deprived and other
neighborhoods in terms of unemployment, crime rates, and
income has widened in the past decade. Therefore, in 2007,
a substantial national investment program was launched by
the secretary of state responsible for housing and labor: €216
million was planned to be invested in the 83 worst-performing
postal code areas, which we refer to as neighborhoods (Court
of Audit, 2010). The average size of a targeted neighbor-
hood is 1.43 square kilometers, so neighborhoods are rather
small. The investment fund was used to assist municipalities
in restructuring and revitalizing neighborhoods. On Septem-
ber 14, 2007, the secretary of state agreed with large public
housing associations that they would invest another €2.5 bil-
lion in the selected neighborhoods in public housing over
a course of ten years (in total, about €7,000 per household
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residing in these neighborhoods) (Court of Audit, 2010).7
Although the exact expenditure is unknown, experts esti-
mate that in the end, about €1 billion was invested between
2007 and 2012 (Permentier et al., 2013). About 90% of the
money was spent on reinvigorating public housing. Upgrad-
ing entails painting the exterior and upgrading the outside
appearance of the buildings, adding double glazing and in-
sulation, adjusting gardens belonging to apartment blocks,
and sometimes demolishing deteriorated housing and replac-
ing it with new apartments. After 2012, the program was
abolished.
Arguably, the physical restructuring of public housing has
a beneficial effect on nearby residents, who prefer to live
in a well-maintained building environment (Rossi-Hansberg
et al., 2010). Such an environment not only improves views,
but also may improve physical and mental health, accord-
ing to a large environmental psychology and health literature
(Srinivasan, O’Fallon, & Dearry, 2003). Apart from physi-
cal restructuring and sale of public housing, a small share
of the investment was targeted at poor households directly
through empowerment programs (Department of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, 2007; Wittebrood &
Permentier, 2011).
Another effect of the program may be indirect. If the so-
cial composition of a neighborhood changes due to the pro-
gram, this may have impacts on house prices. For example,
empirical evidence suggests that high-income households
are disproportionally attracted by amenities (Gaigné, Koster,
Moizeau, & Thisse, 2018). Furthermore, it may be that up-
grading public housing will have a differential effect on high-
and low-income neighborhoods, as Diamond and McQuade
(2016) documented in their study on an increase in the quan-
tity of subsidized housing. We will show that there are minor
changes in the social composition in the treated neighbor-
hood, but controlling for demographics, including neighbor-
hood income, leaves the price effect essentially unaffected.
Heterogeneity of the treatment effect related to the demo-
graphic composition is also minor. For example, we do not
find any evidence that the effects of KW-investments depend
on neighborhood income level. Hence, most of our effect
seems to be explained by improvements in the physical ap-
pearance of neighborhoods.
B. Selection of Neighborhoods
To select eligible neighborhoods, we used so-called depri-
vation scores consisting of eighteen indicators. The indicators
were organized in four categories: social deprivation (income
levels, education, and unemployment), physical deprivation
(quality of housing stock), social problems (vandalism and
crime), and physical problems (noise and air pollution, satis-
faction with living environment). It is important to note that
our outcome variables (house prices, rents, sales times) were
7We consider September 14, 2007, as the start of the investment program,
but we will check for robustness of the assumed date later.
not one of the indicators. Brouwer and Willems (2007) use
data from 1998, 2002, and 2006 to calculate so-called depri-
vation z-scores for each postal code area in the Netherlands
with at least 1,000 inhabitants (about 4,000 areas), where
each of the four categories is weighted equally and standard-
ized with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Because the
overall z-score is the sum of the standardized scores of four
categories, the average score is 0, but the standard deviation
of the overall z-score exceeds 1.
The selection of the KW-neighborhoods was based on
the deprivation score. Only neighborhoods are considered
that have a lower-than-average z-score for each category
(hence, a z-score for each of the categories lower than 0) were
considered (Permentier et al., 2013). Furthermore, neighbor-
hoods with a z-score of at least 7.30 were eligible. How-
ever, four neighborhoods were removed from the list be-
cause they did not have a lower-than-average z-score on each
of the categories. Eight other neighborhoods, after discus-
sion with local governments, were also removed. These were
mainly downtown neighborhoods for which the recorded nui-
sance was related to retail, nightlife, and entertainment ac-
tivities, which are not characteristics of deprivation. In ad-
dition, the local governments of Amsterdam and Enschede
argued that two neighborhoods in their locality for which
the z-score was sufficiently high (above 7.3) should be re-
placed by two neighborhoods that were below the z-score (re-
spectively, 6.84 and 5.00) because the latter neighborhoods
were argued to be experiencing more deprivation.8 In the
end, this implies that fourteen neighborhoods did not com-
ply with the scoring rule. More information on the selection
procedure and the noncomplying neighborhoods is listed in
appendix B.1.
Table 1 reports the z-scores for each of the categories. Un-
surprisingly, targeted KW-neighborhoods have scores that are
much higher than the Dutch average for each of the categories.
In our empirical analysis, we exploit exogenous variation
using the arbitrary threshold of 7.3 to identify the causal ef-
fect of the program. We illustrate some of the features of our
research design and test some assumptions underlying the
regression-discontinuity design we employ later. We start the
analysis by plotting the assignment as a function of z-scores
in figure 1A. While controlling flexibly for the z-score on both
sides of the boundary, we show a substantial discrete jump in
the probability of being selected when z ≥ 7.30. For exam-
ple, a neighborhood with a z-score of 7.29 has a probability
of 2.4% of being included, whereas for a neighborhood with
a z-score of 7.30, this probability is 78%. In the empirical
analysis, we exclude observations within 2.5 kilometers of a
treated neighborhood. Because many noncomplying neigh-
borhoods are relatively close to treated neighborhoods, the
jump will then increase to more than 90%.
8There was substantial criticism on the selection of the specific neighbor-
hoods. According to opponents, the selection criteria were not well chosen
and the postal code areas were too large to capture meaningful neighbor-
hoods. In contrast, we think that neighborhoods are fairly small; the average
distance to the centroid of a neighborhood is only 286 meters.
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TABLE 1.—DEPRIVATION SCORES FOR NEIGHBORHOODS
All Neighborhoods KW-Neighborhoods Non-KW-Neighborhoods
μ σ μ σ μ σ
Social deprivation 0.00 0.654 1.167 0.322 −0.0246 0.636
Physical deprivation 0.00 0.611 2.070 0.660 −0.0437 0.529
Social problems 0.00 0.924 2.612 1.053 −0.0551 0.838
Physical problems 0.00 0.950 3.087 0.976 −0.0651 0.834
Overall 0.00 2.414 8.935 1.340 −0.188 2.047
Number of neighborhoods 4,016 83 3,933
Social deprivation has three indicators: income, unemployment, and low education share. Physical deprivation has three housing quality indicators: shares of small houses, old houses (constructed before 1970), and
public housing stock. Social problems consists of five indicators: two vandalism indicators, two nuisance-from-neighbors indicators, and one indicator relating to feelings of insecurity. Physical problems has seven
indicators: house and living environment satisfaction, the inclination to move, and indicators relating to noise and air pollution, traffic intensity and traffic safety. For details, see Brouwer and Willems (2007).
FIGURE 1.—THE Z-SCORE
(A) A regression of the assignment of a neighborhood on the scoring rule dummy and a third-order polynomial of the z-score on both sides of the boundary. (B) We estimate the test developed by McCrary (2008) to
investigate whether the running variable (the z-score) is continuous around the threshold. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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An important assumption of a RDD is that the density of
the z-score is continuous at the threshold. Otherwise, neigh-
borhoods may have manipulated the z-score and therefore
the propensity to become treated. The latter is implausible
because the deprivation score was a function of eighteen in-
dicators that are very difficult to influence in the short run
(including subjective feelings about the neighborhood, level
of education of residents, and housing stock). What is more
important, the investment program was announced in 2007,
based on data from 2006, 2002, and 1998. It is therefore
highly unlikely that local governments anticipated the ex-
act selection criteria. More formally, we estimate a McCrary
(2008) test for bunching around the threshold. This test in-
vestigates whether the density of the z-score is continuous at
the threshold. Figure 1B shows that this is indeed the case,
which supports our claim that local governments could not
manipulate the z-scores.
III. Empirical Framework, Data,
and Graphical Analysis
A. A Regression-Discontinuity Design
We are interested in the causal effect of the KW-investment
scheme on surrounding house prices. Let log pt be the loga-
rithm of the house price per square meter for a housing unit
in neighborhood  in year t . The house price is a function
of whether the neighborhood has received investments kt in
year t .
When estimating the causal effect of kt on prices, one
faces three main issues. The first is that spatial spillovers of
the KW-program may exist: houses close to a targeted area
may also experience changes in pt due to investments in ad-
jacent neighborhoods (see Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010). Not
controlling for spatial spillovers may lead to a strong under-
estimate of the program’s benefits. In the preferred specifi-
cations, we therefore exclude observations within 2.5 kilo-
meters of a targeted neighborhood. In a sensitivity analysis
(see appendix C.7), we investigate the presence of potential
spatial spillovers.
The second issue is that the treatment is explicitly non-
random: the most deprived neighborhoods are targeted. To
resolve this issue, we employ a first-differences approach,
where the change in the price, pt , is regressed on the
change in the investment. By construction, kt then equals 1
when we observe a property located in a targeted area before
and after the starting date of the program and equals 0 oth-
erwise. Each observation of changes in prices refers to two
housing transactions. Because we have an unbalanced panel,
only a certain percentage of the observations in treated neigh-
borhoods refers to transactions before and after the treatment.
In the empirical analysis, the preferred specifications there-
fore include only observations that refer to changes before
and after the starting date of the program. To further con-
trol for changes to the house (e.g., improvements in main-
tenance that may disproportionally occur in neighborhoods
with older houses), we include changes in housing variables
xt .
The third issue is that while first-differencing may control
for all time-invariant differences between neighborhoods be-
fore treatment, it does not address the issue that unobserved
trends may be correlated with the change in treatment, kt .
This may be problematic when demographic trends such
as gentrification are correlated to the probability of being
treated. To address this issue, we need to find neighborhoods
that are almost identical to KW-neighborhoods but are not
targeted by the investment scheme.
An identification strategy that comes close to random sam-
pling is a regression-discontinuity design (RDD). In this pa-
per, we combine first-differencing with an RDD based on
the deprivation score of the neighborhood. This implies that
we compare changes in prices close to the z-score thresh-
old. This approach approximately provides the causal effect
of the investment if neighborhoods are not able to manipu-
late the score. We already argued and showed in the previous
section that it is extremely unlikely that manipulation is a
problem.
Although local governments could not manipulate the
neighborhood score, some neighborhoods were removed
from the ultimate list and replaced by others after discussions
with the local governments (as discussed in the previous sec-
tion). This makes a standard sharp regression-discontinuity
design (SRD) invalid, as it assumes a one-to-one relationship
between the assignment and the z-score. We then employ
a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design (FRD) because the
neighborhoods that were removed may be a nonrandom se-
lection of eligible neighborhoods. An FRD can be interpreted
as an instrumental variables approach (Imbens & Lemieux,
2008).
In principle, to avoid any bias, one would prefer to in-
clude only observations that are at the z-score threshold, so
c = 7.30. However, this would lead to few observations and
therefore to large standard errors. Hence, we use a local lin-
ear (LL) regression approach, where observations close to
the threshold receive a higher weight (Hahn, Todd, & Van
der Klaauw, 2001).
In the first stage, we regress the change in investment status
on a dummy whether the neighborhood was eligible based on













× (kt − π̃st − β̃xt − υ̃t)2 , (1)
where the ∼ indicates first-stage coefficients, π̃ is the param-
eter of interest, and K (·) denotes the kernel function.
Note that st equals 1 when z ≥ 7.30 and when a property
is sold before and after the investment. In the second stage, we
insert k̂t (and calculate standard errors taking into account
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that k̂t is estimated):
(
α̂, β̂, υ̂t









×( log pt − αk̂t − βxt − υt)2. (2)







where h is the bandwidth that determines how many obser-
vations are included on both sides of the threshold. The es-
timated parameters are usually sensitive to the choice of the
bandwidth. We use the approach proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) to determine the optimal bandwidth.
Because we employ an FRD, the formula to determine the op-
timal bandwidth is somewhat modified, but note that the opti-
mal bandwidth in a FRD is usually very similar to the optimal
bandwidth in an SRD. (See appendix B.3 for the derivation
of the optimal bandwidth.)
Note that a regression-discontinuity design identifies the
local average treatment effect at the threshold. If treatment
effects vary across targeted areas (e.g., a euro invested in the
most deprived neighborhood is more effective than a euro
invested in the eighty-third deprived neighborhood), the lo-
cal average treatment effect would differ from the average
treatment effect of the policy. Nevertheless, when α would
be similar to the estimation procedure where we include all
neighborhoods (h → ∞), this would suggest that the local
average treatment effect at the threshold is equal to the aver-
age treatment effect.
To get more insight into the mechanism of the effects, we
also gather data on demographic variables of the neighbor-
hood, such as average neighborhood income, population den-
sity, and share of foreigners. If the place-based investment
mainly refers to an improved quality of the neighborhood,
we expect that adding these variables will not change the
coefficient of interest. This will add to the credibility of the
regression-discontinuity design: in a valid RDD, adding con-
trol variables does not affect the consistency of the estimated
parameter. But if sorting effects are very important, part of
the positive effect of place-based policies might be explained
by changes in the demographic composition of a neighbor-
hood (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Diamond & McQuade,
2016).9
9In a standard hedonic regression, changes in neighborhood demograph-
ics are usually endogenous. However, because of our research design, this
should not be the case, as changes in neighborhood demographics close to
the threshold should be (almost) identical in the absence of the program.
In appendix C.2, we instrument for potentially endogenous neighborhood
characteristics with shift-share instruments and show that the results are
then virtually identical to the results where we do not control for neighbor-
hood demographics.
B. Adjustment Effects and Treatment Heterogeneity
We are also interested in adjustment effects after the invest-
ment has taken place. In appendix A, we outline a standard
spatial equilibrium model that we combine with the search
and matching framework of Wheaton (1990). When we as-
sume that search costs are proportional to amenity levels with
a delay, we show that sales time drops in the short run, while
this effect disappears in the long run. The time it takes for
sales time to adjust to the former value is indicative of the
time for the housing market to return to a steady state. This
helps to identify the long-run price effect. Let dt be a vari-
able that indicates how many years after the investment the
transaction has taken place. We estimate
(
α̂, β̂, δ̂𝓅, υ̂t















× dt )𝓅 − βxt−υt
)2
, (4)
where α indicates the immediate effect and δ𝓅 are parameters
that capture adjustment effects. We define log st to be the
logarithm of days on the market. We also estimate
(
ζ̂ , η̂, θ̂𝓅, ϕ̂t















× dt )𝓅 − ηxt−ϕt
)2
, (5)
where ζ , θ𝓅, η, and ϕt are parameters to be estimated. The
above equations indicate that we have 𝒫+ 1 endogenous
variables. The instruments are then the change in the scoring
rule dummy and the change in the interaction of the scoring
rule and the 𝒫th polynomial of years after the investment.
Besides adjustment effects, we also pay attention to treat-
ment heterogeneity by investigating whether the treatment is
different for higher-ranked neighborhoods in terms of z-score
to investigate whether place-based policies are more effective
in more deprived neighborhoods and how the treatment varies
with demographic characteristics. This is interesting because
the effects may be different for high- and low-income house-
holds, in line with Diamond and McQuade (2016), or may be
stronger in denser areas, where spillovers are more likely to
arise because properties are closer to each other.
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C. Data and Descriptives
Our analysis is based on a house transactions data set from
the NVM (Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents). It con-
tains information on about 80% of transactions between 2000
and 2014, so roughly seven years before and after the invest-
ment took place. For 1,796,542 transactions, we know the
transaction price, list price, sales time (in days on the market),
exact location, and a wide range of house attributes such as
size (in square meters), type of house, number of rooms, and
construction year. We exclude a few outlier observations.10
These selections do not influence the results. On average,
properties in our sample are sold 1.29 times in our study pe-
riod. In our main analysis, we focus on repeated sales, so
properties that are sold at least twice, leave us with 434,033
transactions.11
We report descriptives in table B2 in appendix B.1. It ap-
pears that about 3.8% of the observations in the repeated sales
sample (16,726 observations) are in a KW neighborhood of
which 42% of the transactions are from after the investment
started. The price per square meter in KW neighborhoods is
3.5% lower than in non-KW neighborhoods. The difference is
small but consistent with the observation that most deprived
neighborhoods are located in urban rather than rural areas,
where prices are generally higher.12 Table B3 in appendix
B.1 also reports descriptive statistics for the full sample, in-
cluding properties that are transacted only once during the
study period. It appears that there are few systematic differ-
ences between the full sample and the repeated sales sample.
In figure B2 in appendix B.1, we plot the house price for
KW and other neighborhoods over time. It is confirmed that
prices in KW-neighborhoods were lower than in other neigh-
borhoods, but this price gap is substantially reduced after
2007, while from 2009 on, house prices seem almost iden-
tical. Although suggestive, one may not conclude that this
reduction in price gap is due to the investment program, be-
cause it ignores that other factors may play a role (e.g., gen-
trification, disproportionate construction of new houses).13
10We exclude transactions with prices that are above €1.5 million or below
€25,000 or a square meter price below €250 or above €5,000. Furthermore,
we exclude transactions that refer to properties smaller than 25 or larger
than 250 square meters. We drop a few properties that are sold more than
five times in our study period or more than twice in one year or are listed for
more than five years on the market or were listed zero days on the market.
We also exclude observations for which the ratio of transaction to list price
is below 0.7 or above 1.1.
11Using repeated sales may imply a selection problem, because certain
house types may be sold less often. In appendix C.10, we check whether
our results are robust with respect to this selection.
12Properties in KW-neighborhoods tend to have a lower quality: they are
more often apartments, are older, less often have central heating, and are of a
lower maintenance quality. Also, 34% of the properties in these areas were
constructed between 1961 and 1970, a building period that is associated
with low building quality in the Netherlands.
13In appendix B.1, we show that the sales time for targeted and nontargeted
neighborhoods is similar until 2007. After the investment, the sales time
is much lower in KW-neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. This
difference seems to become somewhat smaller over time and disappears in
2013.
To allow for changes in neighborhood demographics and
for treatment heterogeneity, we gather data from Statistics
Netherlands on demographics, including average income,
population density, the share of foreigners, age composi-
tion, and household size. For income, data are missing before
2004. Hence, we impute income data using national growth
and 2004 income level. Our results are identical if we exclude
years before 2004. We also obtain detailed land use data from
Statistics Netherlands on the share of residential land, indus-
trial land, land used for infrastructure, open space, and water
bodies.14
D. Graphical Analysis
In figure 2A we plot price changes around the threshold
while controlling for the z-score using a third-order poly-
nomial. Note that our identification strategy is not based on
a standard RDD design in levels. The latter would require
stronger identifying assumptions because it requires that not
only time-varying but also time-invariant unobservable fac-
tors should be uncorrelated to the treatment around the cut-
off. Because we identify the effect based on changes, only
time-varying unobservables should be uncorrelated to the
treatment around the cutoff, whereas we allow time-invariant
unobservables to be correlated. Moreover, because many (un-
observable) factors that influence prices are omitted, the ap-
proach using variation in price levels may be less efficient
and lead to larger standard errors than the approach using
variation in price changes (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). We
therefore exploit variation in prices before and after the treat-
ment and around the threshold. Price changes seem to be
about 3% higher when a neighborhood exceeds the z-score
threshold.15 The price difference is statistically significant at
the 1% level. We will also focus on sales time to examine
adjustment effects. In figure 2B, we show that sales times
are statistically significantly lower (at the 5% level) when
z > 7.3. This graphical analysis hides that the price and sales
time effects might differ in the short and long runs, something
we address in section V.
We also test whether changes in covariates are continu-
ous at the threshold. In figures 2C and 2D, we look at dif-
ferences in changes in house size and maintenance quality,
respectively. If owner-occupied properties would be directly
targeted by the place-based investment, one would expect a
change in maintenance quality or house size. We do not ob-
serve significant changes confirming that home owners are
only indirectly affected by the policy.
In figures 2E and 2F, we investigate changes in demo-
graphics. We emphasize here that those changes do not nec-
essarily have to be continuous at the threshold, as changes in
14The land use data are available only for the years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008,
and 2010, so we impute land use for the intermediate years and assume that
land use has not changed since 2010.
15These results (available on request) are essentially identical if we use
higher-order polynomials.
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FIGURE 2.—CHANGES IN COVARIATES AROUND THE THRESHOLD
These are weighted FRD estimates with a third-order polynomial on both sides of the threshold. The weights are equal to the inverse of the number of observations in a neighborhood. Each dot is a conditional average
for a given z-score. We exclude observations within 2.5 km of a treated neighborhood.
demographics may be a direct result of the policy.16 It can be
seen that neighborhood income is about 1.5% lower after the
investment, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.
16Gerritsen, Webbink, and Ter Weel (2017) provide some evidence that
the share of foreigners (in levels) may be discrete at the z-score threshold.
Because we investigate the effect of a change in the treatment on changes
in house prices, this is not a major problem. Nevertheless, we have also
estimated ancillary regressions where we control for demographics in levels.
The estimated coefficient is similar, albeit even somewhat stronger than the
baseline estimate.
We do not know whether this reduction is due to changes
in the composition of the public housing tenants—for exam-
ple, because public housing associations accepted different
tenants—or due to changes of households in nonpublic hous-
ing, but it implies that after a place-based investment, neigh-
borhoods become slightly more attractive to poor households,
in line with arguments of Diamond and McQuade (2016). For
population density, we do not observe statistically significant
changes. In appendix B.6, we investigate the effects on all
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TABLE 2.—REGRESSION RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF PLACE-BASED POLICIES ON HOUSE PRICES
Dependent Variable: Change in Log House Price per Square Meter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS SRD FRD FRD FRD
 KW-investment 0.0526*** 0.0452*** 0.0426*** 0.0412*** 0.0430*** 0.0332***
(0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0115)
 Housing characteristics (5) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Year fixed effects (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Neighborhood variables (10) No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 185,072 185,072 28,476 24,170 16,839 11,579
Number of clusters 3,138 3,138 257 176 285 184
R2-within 0.365 0.526 0.543
Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic 4,797 9,191 2,592
Bandwidth h* 4.312 3.229 4.600 3.419
We exclude observations within 2.5 kilometers of targeted areas. In column 3, we exclude nontargeted neighborhoods with a z-score above 7.3 and targeted neighborhood with a z-score below 7.3. In columns 4–6,
the change in KW-investment is instrumented with the change in the eligibility based on the scoring rule. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and in parentheses. Significant at ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗0.05, ∗0.10,
+0.15.
demographics in more detail using a local linear approach.
We also test whether the KW-program has influenced home-
ownership shares. This may be important, as (part of) the
treatment effect may be due to changes in homeownership
rates through selling of public housing.
To investigate whether we measure an effect of sorting or
whether the treatment effect captures changes in the neigh-
borhoods’ amenity levels, we estimate specifications where
we control for demographic characteristics and homeowner-
ship shares and show that the treatment effects are essentially
the same.17 Furthermore, we investigate treatment hetero-
geneity in more detail in section IV.C.
IV. Results
A. Baseline Results
We analyze the price effect in the neighborhood that re-
ceived the KW-investment compared to the nontreated neigh-
borhoods. Table 2 reports the regression results.18
We start with a naive regression of the change in house
price on the change in the treatment status. The coefficient
in column 1 shows that investments seem to have generated
a positive effect on prices of e0.0526 − 1 = 5.4%. When we
control for changes in housing attributes (column 2), prices
in targeted neighborhoods have increased by 4.6% relative
to prices in other neighborhoods. In column 3, we employ
a sharp regression-discontinuity design by excluding non-
complying neighborhoods. We find an optimal bandwidth of
4.3, which implies that we include only about 15% of the
observations. The price effect is 4.4% and similar to the pre-
vious specification.19 Because the neighborhoods that were
17We address potential endogeneity of demographic variables in appendix
C.2.
18In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the neighborhood
level because the treatment varies at that level. One may argue that treated
neighborhoods are often concentrated in space. We also have estimated
standard errors while considering treated neighborhoods that are adjacent
to each other as one. This makes little difference for the estimated standard
errors. The results are available on request.
19One may argue that controls are not necessary in a valid RDD. The point
estimates are essentially identical if we exclude control variables but slightly
not treated while they have a sufficiently high z-score might
be a nonrandom sample of the neighborhoods with z ≥ 7.3,
it is preferable to employ a fuzzy regression-discontinuity
design. In the first stage, we regress the change in the assign-
ment variable on the change in the scoring rule of a property
(see table B5 in appendix B.4). In all the specifications, hav-
ing a z-score above the threshold is a very strong instrument
of being treated (F > 2,500), with a coefficient close to 1;
houses that are in a neighborhood with z > 7.3 have an ap-
proximately 98% higher probability of becoming treated. The
second-stage results are in line with previous specifications.
The result in column 4, table 2, implies that prices in KW-
neighborhoods have increased by 4.2% due to the investment
program. In column 5, we explore the robustness of the find-
ings further by removing the observations that are referring
to transactions that occur before or after the treatment date.
While this reduces the sample size by about 30%, this hardly
has an impact on the price effect (4.4%).
Column 6 sheds some light on the potential mechanisms
driving the price effect. Place-based policies may increase
the amenity level but may also influence the composition
of the population. For example, when the types of houses
in the neighborhood increase due to the place-based pol-
icy, age composition of the households may change. These
indirect effects may partly explain the effects on prices.
In appendix B.5, we explore whether neighborhood demo-
graphics are influenced by the policy. We find evidence that
KW-neighborhoods have seen a relative decrease in neigh-
borhood income and an increase in the share of foreigners,
as well as an decrease in the share of elderly people (over
65 years). Also, the average household size seems to have
increased.
To test whether changes in the demographics induced by
the program have caused the price changes or whether the ef-
fect of the place-based investments is mainly due to a direct
change in the quality of nearby public housing, we control
for additional demographic variables in column 6, table 2.
More specifically, we include changes in population density,
less precise. Nevertheless, the estimates are always at least statistically
significant at the 5% level. Those results are available on request.
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TABLE 3.—REGRESSION RESULTS: ADJUSTMENT EFFECTS
 Price per m2 (log)  Days on the Market (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRD FRD FRD FRD FRD FRD
 KW-investment 0.0203** 0.0281** −0.315*** −0.326***
(0.00862) (0.0124) (0.0682) (0.104)
 (KW-investment × 0.00633*** 0.000307 0.0366*** 0.0446
Years after investment) (0.00222) (0.00458) (0.0119) (0.0475)
 (KW-investment × 0.000764 −0.00100
Years after investment)2 (0.000707) (0.00567)
 KW-investment × I(0.0–2.5 0.0297*** −0.281***
Years after investment) (0.0102) (0.0650)
 KW-investment × I(2.5–5.0 0.0416*** −0.194***
Years after investment) (0.0123) (0.0576)
 KW-investment × I(5.0–7.5 0.0559*** −0.0605
Years after investment) (0.0190) (0.0677)
 Housing characteristics (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Year fixed effects (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 24,170 24,199 24,478 57,651 57,651 56,097
Number of clusters 176 177 178 545 545 6.144
Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic 2,413 1,334 2,108 5,252 3,370 22,206
Bandwidth h* 3.242 3.257 3.287 6.219 6.211 6.144
The instruments are  scoring rule and the change in interactions of the scoring rule with the days after the investment. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. Significant at ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗0.05, ∗0.10,
+0.15.
the share of foreigners, share of young (below 25 years) and
elderly people and the average household size and land use.
Increases in population density are associated with price in-
creases. Furthermore, the share of foreigners is correlated
with price decreases. More important, the coefficient of in-
terest is hardly affected by including these controls (3.4%),
which suggests that sorting on observable neighbor charac-
teristics is not a main determinant of the effect of place-based
policies.20 This also seems to suggest that the effect of the
place-based investments is mainly due to a direct change in
the quality of nearby public housing rather than due to sorting
effects.21
In what follows, we generalize our results in two direc-
tions. We investigate the steady-state dynamics and then pay
attention to treatment heterogeneity.
B. Adjustment Effects
We now explicitly distinguish between short-run and long-
run effects by allowing for adjustment effects. According to
theory (see appendix A.3), we expect that the price effect
is permanent. Sales times are expected to become smaller
over time and disappear in the long run once the market has
reached a new steady state. This is given the assumption that
search costs are proportional to house prices—but only in the
long run. To examine the latter, we also analyze the effects on
log days on the market. We estimate equation (4) and use the
20We explore this conclusion further in appendix C.2, where we instru-
ment for potentially endogenous changes in neighborhood characteristics.
21It may be that due to the program, homeownership rates have changed
so that part of the price effect may be attributed to an increase in homeown-
ership. While we find some evidence in appendix B.6 that homeownership
rates indeed have increased, we do not find evidence that the price effect
is any different once we control for changes in homeownership rates (see
appendix C.7).
local linear approach without neighborhood variables, which
corresponds to the specification listed in column 4 in table 2.
We report the estimated coefficients in table 3.22
In column 1, we include a linear interaction term of the
treatment status with the time after the investment (measured
in years). It is shown that there is an immediate price effect
(2.0%). Also the interaction term is positive, so that the price
effect becomes somewhat stronger over time. The specifica-
tion predicts that after five years, the price effect is 5.1% (and
statistically significant at the 1% level), which is similar to
the baseline estimate. Column 2 also includes a second-order
term leading to statistically insignificant interaction effects.
However, it is more insightful to test the joint significance
of these coefficients over time. The results are presented in
figure C1 in appendix C.1. After five years, the price effect
is 4.7%, while the immediate price effect is 2.8%. In column
3, we include interaction terms of the treatment variable and
2.5-year-interval dummies. The same pattern emerges: the
price effect is increasing over time, but not so strongly (the
𝓅-value of 0.0393 indicates that the coefficients are signifi-
cantly different at the 5% level). The price effect in the first
2.5 years might also be a bit lower because of uncertainty
about the exact starting date of the program (an issue we dis-
cuss in more detail in appendix C.9). In any case, the results
demonstrate that the price effect is permanent and that the
price jumps once the policy was introduced.
We now investigate the adjustment effects of sales times
after the announcement of the investment program. It seems
that the sales time effect is immediate and substantial (see col-
umn 4 of table 3). The decrease in sales times is 27%, which
is on average about a month’s reduction in sales times. The
22The bandwidth is optimized assuming that the interaction terms are
exogenous. Given that the bandwidth is similar for the SRD and the FRD,
we do not expect that this has any impact on the results.
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TABLE 4.—HETEROGENEITY IN THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS
 Price per m2 (log)  Days on the market (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRD FRD SRD FRD FRD SRD
Demographic Investment Demographic Investment
Rank Heterogeneity Intensity Rank Heterogeneity Intensity
 KW-investment 0.0375*** 0.0172 −0.333*** 0.0144
(0.0111) (0.0133) (0.0973) (0.130)
 (KW-investment × 0.0420** 0.0630***
Years after investment) (0.0207) (0.0181)
 (KW-investment × 0.0143 −0.0601
Deprivation rank) (0.0138) (0.0875)
 (KW-investment × 0.0341 −0.594**
Neighborhood income (log)) (0.0404) (0.245)
 (KW-investment × 0.0622*** −0.116+
Population density (log)) (0.0148) (0.0725)
 (KW-investment × −0.0850 −0.856*
Share foreigners) (0.0805) (0.455)
 (KW-investment × 0.696** 4.194
Share young people) (0.347) (3.920)
 (KW-investment × 0.0829 3.063***
Share elderly people) (0.162) (0.979)
 (KW-investment × −0.127+ −0.420
Average household size) (0.0867) (0.603)
 (KW-investment × 0.00583 −0.0195
Investments per m2) (0.00848) (0.0488)
 (KW-investment × 0.00204 −0.0207*
(Investments per m2)2) (0.00158) (0.0106)
 (KW-investment × Years after 0.0137***
investment × Investments per m2) (0.00444)
 Housing characteristics (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Neighborhood characteristics (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Year fixed effects (14) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 14,260 11,459 10,794 11,865 63,727 63,857
Number of clusters 241 179 168 192 2,285 2,295
R2-within 0.532 0.056
Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic 703.8 169 387.9 283.8
Bandwidth h 4.248 3.345 3.467 3.513 9.321 8.995
We exclude observations within 2.5 kilometers of targeted areas. The change in KW-investment is instrumented with the change in the eligibility based on the scoring rule. Standard errors are clustered at the
neighborhood level. Significant at ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗0.05, ∗0.10, +0.15.
effect of sales times tends to become less pronounced over
time. After five years, the effect is 12.3%. After 7.5 years, the
effect is essentially 0 and highly insignificant. The same holds
if we include a second-order term in column 5. Figure C1 in
appendix C.1 shows the effects over time, displaying results
that are very similar to the previous specification. Column
6 includes interaction terms, resembling the same pattern.
The sales time effect is the strongest in the first period, while
it converges to 0 within 7.5 years. Hence, these outcomes
show that place-based investments have a permanent effect
on house prices, while only a temporary effect on sales times
because the market has to adjust to a new steady state. The
results for sales time also give us more confidence in the re-
sults for house prices and provide us with information about
the long-term price effect.23
23Recall that house prices and sales time tend to be negatively correlated.
Let us suppose now that our house price results are completely spurious due
to omitted variables. In that case, one would observe a permanent effect on
sales time, in contrast to our results, which show a temporary effect on sales
time.
C. Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effect
In this section we investigate whether we can detect hetero-
geneity in the treatment effect. We report results in table 4. As
a first check, we interact the treatment effect with the depri-
vation rank. We normalize the rank to be between −1 and 1,
with 0 being the average neighborhood, −1 being the worst-
treated neighborhood, and 1 being the best-treated neighbor-
hood (in terms of the z-score). The instrument is the change
in the scoring rule and the rank if just the z-score was deter-
mined to select the neighborhoods. In column 1, we observe
that the average treatment effect is 3.8%, which is close to
the baseline estimate. The interaction effect is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. For sales times, we observe
a similar pattern (see column 5): the instantaneous effect does
not seem to be stronger in worse-performing neighborhoods.
In column 2, we investigate whether the treatment effect
is different for neighborhoods with different demographic
characteristics. To this end, we interact the treatment effect
with the same demographics as reported in table 2. To have
a meaningful main effect, we subtract the locally weighted
mean (based on the corresponding bandwidth) from the
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demographic variable of interest. These results indicate that
place-based investments are much more effective in dense
areas. For example, when population density doubles, the
treatment effect is 4.3 percentage points higher. We think
this makes sense. Because we are interested in the external
effect of investments in public housing on surrounding prop-
erties, it critically matters how close the properties are to each
other. Our finding that the effects are stronger in denser areas
suggests that there is a strong spatial decay in spillovers, in
line with Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010). There also seems to
be a stronger effect in neighborhoods with a higher share of
young people. However, this effect is counteracted by a nega-
tive effect of household size. If we exclude household size, the
effect of young people is highly statistically insignificant. In
column 5, we find somewhat different effects for sales times,
although the results are not always statistically strong. The
immediate effect on sales times seems to be lower in areas
with lower income and that are denser. Furthermore, the sales
time effect seems to be substantially less strong in areas with
a high share of elderly people.24
In column 3 of table 4, we use ancillary data on the direct
spending by the national government per neighborhood (€250
million—about one-quarter of total spending). Because our
instrument is not informative on the level of spending, we
employ a sharp regression-discontinuity design where we
exclude noncomplying neighborhoods. We then include the
spending per square meter of the treated neighborhood area
and the spending squared. The results suggest that the ef-
fect of spending is insignificant. However, when we plot the
treatment effect as a function of spending (see figure C2
in appendix C.1), we find that neighborhoods that have re-
ceived more funding per square meter also have a higher treat-
ment effect. For example, the treatment effect for the average
spending (€2.11 per m2 neighborhood area) is 2.1%, similar
to the baseline estimate, albeit a bit lower. For the neighbor-
hood that received the most spending (€6.83 per m2) we find
a treatment effect of 13.4%. We note, however, that the con-
fidence intervals are not small. The effects on sales times are
similar: it seems that for areas that have received more fund-
ing, the instantaneous sales time effect is stronger. We add
one caveat to these results: we have only information on the
direct spending by the national government, while the total
spending intensity (including the spending by housing associ-
ations) may not be strongly correlated to the direct spending,
as we do not know whether the spending by housing associa-
tions is positively or negatively related to the direct spending
by the national government.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
We subject the baseline results to a wide range of additional
robustness checks and ancillary regressions. In appendix C,
24In appendix C2, we test the robustness of these results by adding the
interactions with the demographic variables one by one. This leads to similar
conclusions.
we discuss all sensitivity analyses in detail. Here, we restrict
ourselves to a summary.
First, in appendix C.1, we investigate whether the base-
line results reported in table 2 hold for time on the mar-
ket, while including an interaction of sales time and years
after the investments. The results indicate a consistent and
strong negative effect of the place-based investment on
sales time, which becomes less pronounced over time in all
specifications.
In appendix C.2, we investigate whether the small decrease
in the price effect when we control for changes in demo-
graphics and land use (see column 6, table 2) is mainly due
to changes in neighborhood demographics or land use. We
further instrument for potentially endogenous neighborhood
characteristics and show that the price effect is very similar.
This is followed in appendix C.3 by a sensitivity analysis for
the heterogeneity in the treatment effect, leading to the same
conclusion that place-based investments are more effective
in denser areas.
Fourth, in appendix C.4 we investigate whether we can
detect effects on the private and public housing rental mar-
ket using information on housing surveys from 2002, 2006,
2009, 2012, and 2015. Each wave consists of about 60,000
respondents and is considered a representative survey of the
Dutch population. The surveys provide information on a wide
range of housing characteristics, including the rent paid and
whether the property is rent controlled (always the case for
the public housing stock). We first focus on the effects of the
(noncontrolled) private rental stock. The preferred estimate
seems to suggest that rents have increased by about 9% due
to the KW-program. We do not find evidence of adjustment
effects: the increase in private rents is immediate and perma-
nent. A caveat here is that because the private rental market
is such a small proportion of the housing market, the number
of observations is rather low and the estimates are imprecise
and therefore only marginally significant. We repeat those
analyses for the regulated rent where we do not find any evi-
dence of the KW-program having an effect on rents. Because
those rents are rent controlled and essentially do not relate to
underlying characteristics of the property or neighborhood,
this result makes sense.
In appendix C.5, we run a set of quasi-placebo experi-
ments. We investigate whether we can detect price changes
in neighborhoods that were on a previous list of 340 neigh-
borhoods that had some deprivation. Alternatively, we use
a list of neighborhoods that receive investments by another
program before the study period (so are in some way de-
prived) but do not receive KW-investments. A final placebo
check involves the use of alternative deprivation scores to
exploit the randomness in the determination of the z-score.
We then investigate what happens if the 83 worst-performing
neighborhoods would have been selected based on this alter-
native score. All of these quasi-placebo regressions support
the conclusion that our results indeed are driven by the KW-
investment and not by other investments or a general price
trend in deprived neighborhoods.
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Sixth, in appendix C.6, we further investigate the issue of
unobserved trends that may be correlated to the treatment. In
particular, one may argue that the year of implementation is
about at the peak of house prices. Mean reversion would then
imply that prices of KW- and non-KW-neighborhoods con-
verge. As a check, we therefore exclude transactions around
the peak of the housing market, between 2005 and 2011. Al-
though this strongly reduces the number of observations, the
coefficients are essentially unaffected despite the somewhat
larger standard error. Although we employ an RDD and con-
trol for neighborhood income, one might still be worried that
our results are driven by either city-specific price trends or by
the more general trend that city centers seem to become more
attractive. Because many treated neighborhoods are close to
the historic city center, they may benefit from trends like gen-
trification that occur in and near the center. We continue by
controlling for the distance to the nearest city center with at
least 50,000 inhabitants. It appears that places closer to the
city center have indeed become more expensive. The treat-
ment effects, however, are essentially unaffected.
Seventh, we examine in appendix C.7 whether spatial
spillovers of the investment program are important. When al-
lowing for spatial spillovers, we need to take into account that
several KW-neighborhoods are located close to each other,
so that properties outside these neighborhoods benefit from
spatial spillovers from multiple treated areas. Hence, we in-
clude the number of treated neighborhoods within 500 meter
rings of the property. The main effects are very similar to the
baseline estimates, while spillovers are largely statistically
insignificant.
In appendix C.8, we investigate whether controlling for
the share of home ownership and the share of private rental
housing changes the results. This may be important for the
interpretation of the result as the program led to some in-
creases (though small ones) in the share of owner-occupied
housing (see appendix B.6). However, using information on
housing surveys for 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2012, we do not
find any evidence that our results can be explained by changes
in homeownership, as the treatment effect is essentially iden-
tical once we control for changes in the share of private rental
and owner-occupied housing. Hence, it seems that the policy
did indeed have an effect through the improvement of public
housing.
Ninth, we test robustness of our results with respect to the
starting date of the investment in appendix C.9. Although
the official announcement of the program was on March 22,
2007, it was not clear when and how much money would
be invested in the neighborhoods. As the starting date of the
KW-scheme, we therefore use the date at which the secretary
of state agreed with large public housing associations that
they would invest in the KW-neighborhoods. However, the
uncertainty on the exact starting date of the program seems
not to matter for our results.
Tenth, in appendix C.10, we test for the robustness of our
results to assumptions with respect to the bandwidth of the
local linear regression approach. This is followed by an inves-
tigation of whether using the full sample, rather than repeated
sales influences our results. The coefficients are very similar
to the baseline specification—if anything, they are slightly
higher. The results are reported in appendix C.11.
Finally, we confirm in appendix C.12 that our results are
robust to the choice of identification strategy by employing a
nonparametric propensity score matching method rather than
a regression-discontinuity approach.
VI. The KW-Program and the Overall Gains
in Property Values
We seek to gain insight into the rate of return through the
external effect of the revitalization policy. We reiterate that
we measure external effects because we focus on investments
in the public housing stock on the prices of owner-occupied
properties. Hence, we do not have estimates on the direct
effect of the program. Nevertheless, the direct effects are
expected to be positive. Because we focus on the external
effects, the calculated rate of return will serve as a strong
underestimate of the total benefits of the program.25
We use additional data on the number of housing units
from Statistics Netherlands. We estimate the benefits and
costs in 2007 prices by deflating house prices by the consumer
price index, obtained from Statistics Netherlands. We assume
that the average price is constant across the study period, so
pt = p. To estimate the average price for owner-occupied
housing in each neighborhood, we take the average of deflated
prices of all transactions in our study period. Furthermore, we
gather data on the average house prices of all properties in
each neighborhood, including rental properties, which have
slightly lower housing values than owner-occupied proper-
ties.26 Table 5 reports the back-of-the-envelope calculations
for different scenarios.27 We start with the parsimonious es-
timate of the benefits. The average increase in house prices is
then about €5,000, which is approximately 3% of the mean
house price. The effect is somewhat higher once we use the
long-run estimate. The total benefits for homeowners are
about €0.5 billion. The results indicate the gain-to-funding
ratio is about 0.5 given the realized investments of €1 billion.
To also include the benefits on (noncontrolled) private
renters, we use the average house prices of all properties. In
the second calculation, we assume that the effect on private
25Expenditures through the KW-program were financed from additional
and external sources and were not part of the municipal budget or the budget
of housing associations. In contrast, when expenditures are raised by limit-
ing expenses in other neighborhoods, for example, this may imply that pos-
itive externalities are reduced in nontargeted areas (Rossi-Hansberg et al.,
2010).
26We ignore that house owners can deduct their interest mortgage pay-
ments from their income, so prices of owner-occupied housing may some-
what exceed housing values compared to an unregulated market.
27One may argue that the welfare calculation is incomplete because we do
not take into account the welfare benefits that arise in neighborhoods that
are close but did not get the subsidy (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2008). We showed
weak evidence for spatial spillovers in the sensitivity analysis, although the
confidence intervals are quite large. Hence, the estimates presented here
are, if anything, underestimates of the total effects of place-based policies.
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TABLE 5.—TOTAL BENEFITS OF THE KW-PROGRAM
Benefits per Property Owner (in €) Total Benefits (in billion €)
Scenarios Baseline Estimate Long-Run Estimate Baseline Estimate Long-Run Estimate
Owner-occupied housing 5,224 6,347 0.481 0.585
Owner-occupied and private-rental housing: Effect on
private-rental equal to effect on owner-occupied housing
5,200 6,318 0.824 1.001
Owner-occupied and private-rental housing 9,715 12,258 1.539 1.942
All housing: Effect on public housing equal to effect on
private-rental housing
13,102 16,723 4.951 6.319
The estimated benefits are in 2007 prices. Information on number of housing units is based on Statistics Netherlands 2012.
renters is the same as for homeowners. Because the share
of owner-occupied housing is small in KW-neighborhoods
(only 24%), the benefits are now substantially larger: the
gain-to-funding ratio is about 0.8.
It may be preferable to explicitly use the point estimates
for the private rental market as shown and discussed in the
sensitivity analysis. Because we find stronger effects for pri-
vate rents than for the owner-occupied housing market (see
appendix C.4), the average benefits to property owners (in-
cluding landlords) are 85% higher. This also implies gain-
to-funding ratios that are above 1, so the external effects
of the KW-investment program are larger than the supposed
investments.
Homeowners living in the neighborhood at the time of the
investments have benefited directly from the program due to
the increase in house prices. Homeowners are usually higher-
income households. The KW-program was meant to help
poor households and reduce inequality, so homeowners were
not the intended beneficiaries of the program. We have shown
that the subsidy does not capitalize in controlled rents (see
appendix C.4), so public housing renters enjoy the positive
neighborhood effects that are caused by the program without
paying for it. To get a rough idea of the total benefits to renters
in public housing, we assume an identical monetary effect on
public rental housing as on private rental housing. The aver-
age benefits per property are then about €13,000. This also
implies that the gain-to-funding ratios are substantially larger
and around 5, so that about two-thirds of the external benefits
of the program accrue to renters in public housing.28 Note that
public housing renters, besides the increase in neighborhood
quality, also have benefited directly from improvements in
their properties. In other words, the program seems to have
been effective in increasing the welfare of the poor.
The latter estimates probably serve as an upper bound of
the external benefits of the program, but we note that the
estimates are still in line with Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010),
who also found substantial gain-to-funding ratios for an urban
renewal project in Richmond, Virginia.
28The total benefits in the fourth scenario are €4.95 billion; they are €1.54
billion when we ignore public housing tenants. Hence, 69% of the total
benefits accrue to renters in the public housing sector. We note that this
estimate is given the assumption that the effect on public housing is equal
to effect on private-rental housing, as measured in appendix C.4.
VII. Conclusion
In many countries, governments invest in deprived neigh-
borhoods to reduce income disparities within cities and fight
social problems. In Europe, this mainly involves an improve-
ment in the quality of the public housing stock. There is a
limited understanding to what extent such a place-based pol-
icy is effective and has external positive effects on nearby
residents.
In this paper, we aim to estimate the external effects on
nearby households in the owner-occupied market of a na-
tionwide investment program that improved the quality of
public housing in the 84 most deprived neighborhoods in
the Netherlands. A rich repeated sales data set on house
sales in the period 2000 to 2014 is used. We explicitly take
into account that treated neighborhoods are not randomly
chosen by governments. We combine a first-differences ap-
proach with a (fuzzy) regression-discontinuity design based
on a jump in the probability of being treated, which depends
on neighborhood-specific deprivation scores. We find com-
pelling evidence for the presence of positive external effects
on nearby property owners of the investment scheme. The
program has led to an increase in surrounding house prices
of 3.5% and to temporary reductions in sales time that dis-
appear after 7.5 years. We also find evidence for treatment
heterogeneity: the effect is stronger in dense areas, likely
because spillovers are more pronounced when properties are
closer to each other. We calculated that the welfare benefits to
property owners induced by the place-based policy program
are sizable and at least half of the value of the expenditure
on public housing. Moreover, public housing renters bene-
fit from improvements in their properties and neighborhood
quality, while not paying a higher rent and are therefore better
off. Hence, the program has been effective in increasing the
welfare of poor households.
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